Human Rights Brief
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 2

2008

Military Jurisdiction, the Right Not to be Tried, and the Suspension
Clause After Boumediene
Stephen I. Vladeck
American University Washington College of Law, svladeck@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Vladeck, Stephen I. "Military Jurisdiction, the Right Not to be Tried, and the Suspension Clause After
Boumediene." Human Rights Brief 16, no.1 (2008): 6-10.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Human Rights Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Military Jurisdiction, the Right Not to be Tried,
and the Suspension Clause After Boumediene
by Stephen I. Vladeck*

I

I. Introduction

n its landmark decision holding that non-citizens detained
as

“enemy

combatants” at

Guantánamo Bay

have a con-

stitutional right to petition the federal courts for a writ

of habeas corpus challenging their detention, the Supreme
Court in Boumediene v. Bush1 expressly invalidated parts of
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section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),2 the
plain text of which would otherwise have precluded such suits.3
In particular, the Court held that Congress had failed to provide
an adequate alternative to habeas corpus, and that, as a result,
the MCA violates the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, which
protects the right of those who fall within its scope to challenge
the legality of their detention unless there has been a formal
“suspension” of the writ — an extraordinary measure that can
only occur “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public
Safety may require it.” 4
Unsurprisingly, a number of questions have arisen in
Boumediene’s aftermath concerning just how broadly the
Court’s reasoning sweeps. In particular, there has been substantial wrangling in recent months over what remains of section 7
— and whether the MCA still precludes the Guantánamo detainees from bringing any lawsuit potentially outside the scope of
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, including challenges to
the conditions of their confinement.5
Whereas virtually all of the post-Boumediene focus has
thus been on detainees challenging aspects of their detention, a
separate but no less important question has arisen in the context
of the military commissions created by the MCA, on which
Congress conferred both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction far broader than any U.S. military commission has previously exercised — and perhaps broader than the Constitution
and the laws of war allow.6 Thus, several commission defendants have argued that they fall outside the personal jurisdiction
that the commissions may lawfully exercise, and that Congress
also lacked the power to confer subject-matter jurisdiction over
the offenses with which they have been charged. At least some
of these “jurisdictional” challenges go to whether the defendants
can be tried by military commissions at all — and, if they have
a right not to be tried by commissions acting without jurisdiction, whether that right can be vindicated before the potentially
unlawful trial occurs.

“Shut Down Guantánamo” Protest before the U.S. Supreme Court.

The language of the MCA, though, purports to bar any collateral attack — including habeas petitions — challenging the
jurisdiction of the military tribunals. In particular, 10 U.S.C.
§ 950j(b) (part of section 3 of the MCA), provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any other provision of law (including
section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus
provision), no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause
of action whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution,
trial, or judgment of a military commission under this
chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of military commissions under this chapter.7
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This essay takes up the question of the relationship between
§ 950j(b) and the Court’s decision in Boumediene. As the dis6

Over its history, the Supreme Court has issued a
number of decisions reflecting a tacit recognition by
the Court that collateral challenges to military jurisdiction
are not just properly brought through habeas petitions,
but may well lie at the heart of the right that the
Constitution’s Suspension Clause protects — a right
to be free from unlawful executive detention.
cussion that follows explains, because a collateral challenge
to military jurisdiction is tantamount to a challenge to “pure”
executive detention, such lawsuits fall within the “core” of
the Suspension Clause. In other words, the Suspension Clause
necessarily protects a right not to be tried by a military commission acting without jurisdiction. And because, per Boumediene,
the Suspension Clause “applies” to the Guantánamo detainees,8
the only remaining question under the analysis the Court used in
Boumediene is whether the MCA provides an adequate alternative remedy to vindicate a commission defendant’s right not to
be tried. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
already held, though, the MCA provides commission defendants with no interlocutory remedy, even where the challenge
is to the commission’s jurisdiction.9 Thus, § 950j(b) precludes
commission defendants from vindicating a right not to be tried
until after the trial has occurred, and must therefore be unconstitutional as so applied. Although this essay thus focuses on a
largely doctrinal argument, such analysis is simply means to an
end — to highlight the importance of collateral review in civilian courts, especially where there are such serious questions as
to whether the defendant is subject to military jurisdiction in the
first place.
Part II begins with the argument that the Suspension Clause
protects an ex ante right to collaterally attack the jurisdiction
of a military court — a right not to be tried — by comparing
such “jurisdictional” challenges to other contexts where the
Supreme Court has recognized an analogous right. Part III turns
to the MCA, and details how it precludes such collateral challenges — and thereby fails to provide a commission defendant
with a meaningful opportunity to vindicate his right not to be
tried. Finally, Part IV concludes by criticizing the one district
court decision that has considered § 950j(b) to date — Judge
Robertson’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction in
Hamdan v. Gates.10 Although Hamdan did not formally resolve
the constitutionality of § 950j(b), Judge Robertson’s decision
to abstain in favor of post-conviction proceedings frustrates
the very right that Hamdan sought to vindicate, a right that the
Suspension Clause necessarily protects.

II. Military Tribunals and the
Right Not to be Tried
Over its history, the Supreme Court has issued a number of
decisions reflecting a tacit recognition by the Court that collateral challenges to military jurisdiction are not just properly
brought through habeas petitions, but may well lie at the heart
of the right that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause protects
— a right to be free from unlawful executive detention. Thus,
the question whether the Constitution protects a right not to be
tried by a military commission acting without jurisdiction may
have already been answered, albeit implicitly.
First, to the precedents: As Justice Scalia has admonished,
One must be careful . . . not to play word games with
the concept of a “right not to be tried.” In one sense,
any legal rule can be said to give rise to a “right not to
be tried” if failure to observe it requires the trial court
to dismiss the indictment or terminate the trial. . . .
A right not to be tried . . . rests upon an explicit
statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not
occur . . . .11
Thus, the paradigmatic example of a right not to be tried
is that conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person
shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”12 It is not the conviction that violates the
constitutional prohibition; it is the trial itself.13
To be sure, the Supreme Court has never identified a parallel
constitutional provision that guarantees that “trial will not occur”
in the context of a military tribunal acting without jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, precedents dating back to the Founding recognize
the ability — indeed, the responsibility — of the Article III
courts to entertain collateral challenges to military jurisdiction,14
along with the parallel notion that the Constitution limits both
the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction of military commissions.15
Most notably, in a series of cases decided during the 1950s,
the Court repeatedly reached the merits of challenges to military
7

jurisdiction brought by U.S. citizens stationed (or related to
someone stationed) overseas, even though there was a substantial question as to whether the federal courts had statutory jurisdiction to entertain such lawsuits.16 Justice Scalia himself would
later describe these decisions as recognizing that “constitutional
doubt [over the availability of habeas corpus] . . . might indeed
exist with regard to a citizen abroad — justifying a strained
construction of the habeas statute, or (more honestly) a determination of constitutional right to habeas.”17 It wasn’t just that
habeas corpus was available as of right to contest their detention; the writ was available as of right to test their amenability
to military jurisdiction.
More than just recognizing that the Constitution might
protect such a right, these cases also suggested that, for such a
right to be meaningful, it had to be redressable ex ante. As the
younger Justice Harlan would explain in Noyd v. Bond,18 the
Court in these cases had not only entertained collateral attacks
on the jurisdiction of the military courts, but had allowed such
challenges to proceed without requiring that petitioners exhaust
their remedies within the military court system. In his words,
“it appeared especially unfair to require exhaustion of military
remedies when the complainants raised substantial arguments
denying the right of the military to try them at all.”19
Moreover, such a reading of the Suspension Clause — as
protecting a right to challenge military jurisdiction — makes
practical sense; as part of the executive branch, military courts
acting without jurisdiction implicate the same concerns as extrajudicial executive detention — i.e., the executive is seeking to
detain someone without the traditional safeguards attendant to
judicial review by courts acting within their jurisdiction.
Thus, it is no surprise that, in another World War II-era
decision rejecting on the merits a collateral attack on a military
commission, the Supreme Court took pains to emphasize that
Congress had not suspended habeas corpus, and that the Court
thereby had the responsibility to inquire into the jurisdiction of
the commission that tried and convicted the petitioner (and ultimately sentenced him to death). As Chief Justice Vinson wrote,
“[Congress] has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of
the government could not, unless there was suspension of the
writ, withdraw from the courts the duty and power to make such
inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made by
habeas corpus.”20

locutory appeal. In Khadr, the trial court had concluded that it
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, on the ground
that his “Combatant Status Review Tribunal” (CSRT) had determined only that he was an “enemy combatant,” not an “unlawful
enemy combatant” as required by the jurisdiction-conferring
provision of the MCA.24 The government took an interlocutory
appeal to the “Court of Military Commission Review”25 (as
provided by the MCA), which reversed the trial court. Khadr
then sought to appeal that decision to the D.C. Circuit, only to
have the Court of Appeals conclude that there was no authority
in the MCA for a defendant to appeal any decision until and
unless his conviction is confirmed by the convening authority. If
no interlocutory appeal was available to a defendant in Khadr’s
position, it is hard to imagine a case where such relief would be
available.
Third, even if one viewed the right protected by the
Suspension Clause more narrowly — as going to an ability to
collaterally challenge military jurisdiction at some point, as
opposed to ex ante, there are reasons even to doubt the efficacy
of the MCA’s provisions concerning a post-conviction appeal.
For starters, new 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c) appears intended to limit
the scope of the D.C. Circuit’s review to whether the “final
decision” is consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the MCA, and whether those standards and procedures
are themselves consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States. As Justice Kennedy wrote of similar language
in Boumediene, “If Congress had envisioned [such] review as
coextensive with traditional habeas corpus, it would not have
drafted the statute in this manner.”26
Indeed, missing from the scope of the D.C. Circuit’s appellate
review are claims that the commission lacked jurisdiction over
either the defendant or the subject-matter; that the commission’s
standards and procedures violated the defendant’s treaty-based
rights (including procedural rights conferred by the Geneva
Conventions); and other challenges to collateral orders by the
trial court not necessarily included with its “final decision.” And
even if it is substantively adequate, the post-conviction appellate review for which the MCA provides is only triggered once
the “convening authority” approves the “final decision” of the
military commission, even though the statute nowhere specifies
a timeframe within which such action must be taken.27
The upshot of the above analysis, then, is that the MCA
does not provide an adequate substitute to habeas corpus in two
respects: First, it provides no opportunity — let alone an inadequate opportunity — for commission defendants meaningfully
to vindicate their right not to be tried before the trial itself takes
place. Second, it appears to provide an inadequate opportunity
for the defendant to vindicate both those claims and other challenges to the proceedings after the fact. The MCA does not
channel the defendant’s claims into a post-conviction appeal,
as the government has argued;28 rather, it channels those claims
into the very military process whose legitimacy is challenged,
and provides no meaningful opportunity for independent review
by the Article III courts. To suggest that it nevertheless provides
an adequate substitute to habeas corpus is to turn the concept of
adequate alternative remedies on its head.
In all, there can be little question that the MCA plainly bars
military commission defendants from collaterally challenging
their amenability to military jurisdiction. The only possible
challenge for which the MCA provides is one subsequent to the

III. Collateral Review Under the MCA
In light of the above analysis, it should not take much convincing to show that the MCA fails adequately to provide for
collateral challenges to military jurisdiction. First, § 950j(b),
quoted above, provides that “no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action
whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of
a military commission under this chapter,” except as provided
by the MCA.21 Moreover, the provision expressly includes
habeas petitions within its scope, thus defeating any argument
that Congress was insufficiently clear in manifesting its intent to
preclude habeas review, in particular.22
Second, a defendant’s right to a statutory appeal under the
MCA only allows him to challenge the “final” decision of the
military commission. Such a narrow reading of the defendant’s
right to appeal was confirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Khadr v.
United States,23 perhaps the paradigm case for allowing an inter8

The MCA does not channel the defendant’s
claims into a post-conviction appeal, as the government
has argued; rather, it channels those claims into the
very military process whose legitimacy is challenged,
and provides no meaningful opportunity for
independent review by the Article III courts.
defendant’s trial and conviction. And at that point, such review
— even if it encompasses all potential claims — comes too late;
the bell cannot be un-rung.

more power to intrude upon a defendant’s constitutional right
not to be tried than the President does, acting unilaterally. It may
be that Hamdan was ultimately bound to lose on the merits of
his collateral challenge — that his commission was acting with
jurisdiction — but that conclusion cannot follow simply from
the existence of the MCA.

IV. Hamdan and the MCA’s Larger Implications
All of these arguments were advanced to Judge Robertson
in the Hamdan proceedings, where Hamdan’s counsel sought
to have his trial by military commission stayed until he had a
meaningful opportunity collaterally to contest the commission’s
jurisdiction.29 And yet, rather than reach the merits of Hamdan’s
argument — that the Suspension Clause protected his right to
collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the military commission
— Judge Robertson deferred. As he wrote,

***
The above discussion is rather technical, and may even
strike the reader as bordering on legal semantics. Where the
Guantánamo detainees are concerned, even a successful challenge to the jurisdiction of the military commission doesn’t
do much to the status quo — on the government’s view, the
defendant is still subject to detention (albeit without trial) as an
“enemy combatant.” And the “right not to be tried” tends not to
arise that often, or in a large enough number of cases so as to
excite more than academic commentary.
But there are also distinct and palpable injuries suffered
by defendants who are subjected to the process of courts acting without jurisdiction, for they have to mount a defense (and
perhaps even consider plea offers) in a regime the legitimacy of
which they contest — and which may well be struck down on
a post-conviction appeal. In mounting a defense, the defendant
may have to produce evidence or provide statements that could
be used against him in later proceedings. It is for these reasons
that no court before Hamdan had ever precluded a defendant
with a substantial challenge to the jurisdiction of a military
tribunal from collaterally attacking that jurisdiction before trial,
and why Boumediene’s extension of the Suspension Clause
to Guantánamo compels the result that 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) is
unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents such a claim. After
all, while it is troubling enough for Congress to create a system
of military tribunals with personal and subject-matter jurisdiction that runs so closely to — if not beyond — constitutional
limits, it is simply indefensible for Congress to simultaneously
preclude the Article III courts from enforcing those limits if and
when they are transgressed.		
HRB

The absence of a full-scale habeas hearing as to
Hamdan’s classification as an unlawful enemy combatant does not, by itself, raise a substantial question about the Commission’s jurisdiction to proceed.
Moreover, under the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in
Khadr, all of Hamdan’s jurisdictional arguments can
be addressed, if necessary, following final judgment
in accordance with § 950g. Where both Congress and
the President have expressly decided when Article III
review is to occur, the courts should be wary of disturbing their judgment.30
Of course, Judge Robertson’s discussion misses the point, for
it neglects the extent to which Hamdan claimed a right not to be
tried — a claim that, as noted above, cannot be fully redressed
“following final judgment.” Odder still, it was the same jurist
in 2004 who found that precise argument compelling, ruling in
Hamdan’s initial habeas petition that abstention was inappropriate on almost the same facts.31 As the D.C. Circuit noted in
Hamdan’s case in 2005, “setting aside the judgment after trial
and conviction insufficiently redresses the defendant’s right not
to be tried by a tribunal that has no jurisdiction.”32 The only
difference is the intervention of Congress in the form of the
MCA, but it should go without saying that Congress has no
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